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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
 
No. 17-3025 
   
 
KAREN SHANAIR HENRY, 
                           Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent 
 
__________________________  
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No.:  A205-986-944) 
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley 
_____________________________ 
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 on April 17, 2018 
 
 
 
             Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
  
(Opinion Filed: May 2, 2018) 
 
     
 
O P I N I O N* 
___________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Karen Shanair Henry1 petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision of inadmissibility and 
order of removal. The IJ sustained four independent charges of inadmissibility against 
Henry: (1) alien present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled (8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(1)); (2) alien who by fraud or willful misrepresentation procured or sought 
to procure a visa, other documentation or admission into the U.S. or other benefit under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)); (3) alien who 
falsely represented herself to be a U.S. citizen for any purpose or benefit under federal or 
state law (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)); and (4) alien who has been convicted of or 
who admits to committing acts which constitute a crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)).  
Henry concedes that she was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Br. for 
Appellant at 26. Our review is therefore limited to constitutional and legal issues; we do 
not review the agency’s findings of fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Pierre v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008). Henry argues that she is not 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(1), (a)(6)(C)(i), or (a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). She also 
argues that her inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) should be waived. 
These arguments rely in part on the IJ’s factual findings, which are outside the scope of 
our review. To the extent that her arguments raise reviewable legal issues, they are 
without merit. We will therefore deny Henry’s petition for review.  
                                              
1 The petitioner also goes by the name Karen Ming Henry. 
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I. Background 
Henry is a Jamaican citizen who entered the United States some time in or before 
2012. In 2012, Henry applied for a U.S. passport, falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen. 
SA59. As a result, Henry was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542, which prohibits 
knowingly making a false statement in an application for a U.S. passport. SA59, 62. 
Henry pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542 in the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware. Henry v. United States, No. 1:12-cr-00065-RGA, 29014 WL 
5307177 (D. Del. Oct. 17, 2014).  
Henry was placed in removal proceedings on November 14, 2013. SA 70-72. The 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Henry as inadmissible on four 
independent grounds under 8 U.S.C. § 1182: (1) alien who is present in the U.S. without 
being admitted or paroled (§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)); (2) alien who by fraud or willful 
misrepresentation procured or sought to procure a visa, other documentation, or 
admission into the U.S. or other benefit under the INA (§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)); (3) alien who 
falsely represented herself to be a U.S. citizen for any purpose or benefit under federal or 
state law (§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)); and (4) alien who has been convicted of or who admits 
to committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral 
turpitude (§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)). SA72. 
The IJ concluded that DHS had produced sufficient evidence of Henry’s alienage, 
including a Jamaican birth certificate in Henry’s name and her own previous admission 
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that she was not a U.S. citizen.2 A12, 38. The burden then shifted to Henry to show the 
time, place, and lawful manner of her entry into the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1361. An alien who 
fails to meet this burden is presumed to be in the U.S. in violation of the law.  Id.  
According to Henry, she entered the U.S. in 1998 and was legally admitted at that 
time. SA6-7. However, DHS presented evidence showing that Henry had applied for a 
U.S. non-immigrant visa (“NIV”) at the U.S. consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, in 2005.3 
A68. The application included a picture of Henry and a set of fingerprints matching 
Henry’s. Id. Henry denied having been in Jamaica in 2005, but the IJ did not find her 
testimony credible. A14. The IJ therefore concluded that, regardless of whether Henry 
had been admitted to the U.S. in 1998, Henry had been in Jamaica in 2005 and had 
subsequently re-entered the U.S. at some point. Since Henry failed to present any 
evidence of a legal re-entry into the U.S. in or after 2005, the IJ concluded that Henry 
was inadmissible as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). A10. 
The IJ sustained the remaining three charges of inadmissibility as well. When 
Henry pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542, she admitted in her plea colloquy that 
she had knowingly misrepresented herself as a U.S. citizen to secure a U.S. passport. 
A58-59. This rendered Henry inadmissible as an alien who attempted to procure a visa or 
other documentation through willful misrepresentation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 
and as an alien who falsely represented herself to be a U.S. citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 
                                              
2 Henry does not challenge the IJ’s finding of alienage on appeal.  
3 The NIV application was refused in 2005. A68. 
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1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). Henry testified before the IJ that, at the time she applied for the 
passport, she believed she was a U.S. citizen. However, the IJ did not credit this self-
serving testimony because it was “belied by the clear and unequivocal statements” she 
had made before the District Court and because Henry was not an overall credible 
witness. A14-15, A17.  Finally, the IJ sustained the charge of inadmissibility under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) because making a false statement to secure a government 
benefit is a crime involving moral turpitude. Rodriguez v. Gonzalez, 451 F.3d 60, 61 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Matter of Pinzon, 26 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2013);. A15. The IJ ordered Henry 
removed to Jamaica. A3.  
Henry filed a timely Notice of Appeal with the BIA. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
decision without opinion. A1-2. Henry filed a timely Petition for Review of the BIA’s 
decision on September 18, 2017. A18. 
II. Standard of Review 
We review an IJ’s decision as the final agency decision in cases where the BIA 
affirms the decision of an IJ without opinion. Borrome v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 687 F.3d 
150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Henry concedes that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Br. 
for Appellant at 26. Therefore, our review is limited to constitutional claims and legal 
questions, which we review de novo. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Yusupov v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 977 (3d Cir. 2011). The IJ’s factual and discretionary 
determinations are outside the scope of our review. Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184.   
III. Analysis 
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Henry does not raise any meritorious legal questions or constitutional claims for 
our review. Henry makes four arguments: (1) she was admitted to the U.S. after an 
inspection and is therefore not inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); (2) she 
did not willfully provide false information on her passport application and is therefore not 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); (3) she did not willfully misrepresent 
herself as a U.S. citizen and is therefore not inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 
(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I); and (4) although she committed a crime of moral turpitude, she is eligible 
for a waiver of inadmissibility. These arguments rest in part on the IJ’s factual findings, 
which are outside the scope of our review. To the extent that her arguments raise legal 
questions, they are without merit. 
a. Inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 
First, Henry argues that she is not inadmissible as an alien present in the U.S. 
without being admitted or paroled because she was legally admitted to the U.S. in 1998 
after an inspection. See Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285, 310 (BIA 2010) (finding 
that an admission after inspection can constitute a legal entry).   
However, based on the 2005 NIV application, the IJ concluded that, regardless of 
whether Henry was admitted to the U.S. in 1998, she was in Jamaica in 2005 and 
therefore re-entered the United States in or after 2005. This finding of fact is outside the 
scope of our review.  
“It is a general principle of immigration law that an alien who leaves the country 
and makes a new entry on his or her return is then subject to all current exclusionary 
laws.” Dabone v. Karn, 763 F.2d 593, 595 (3d Cir. 1985).  “The new entry stands the 
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alien on the same footing as if it were the initial entry.” Id. Therefore, Henry bore the 
burden of proving the time, place, and lawful manner of her re-entry to the U.S. in or 
after 2005. 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Ah Chiu Pang v. INS, 368 F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(holding that once the government proves alienage, “the burden shift[s] to the [alien] to 
justify his presence in the United States”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1361). An alien who fails to 
meet this burden is presumed to be in the U.S. in violation of the law. Id. Henry presented 
absolutely no evidence related to her re-entry, let alone any evidence suggesting that her 
re-entry was lawful. Therefore, she is presumed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled.  
b. Inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 
Next, Henry argues that she is not inadmissible as an alien who by fraud or willful 
misrepresentation procured or sought to procure a visa, other documentation, or 
admission to the U.S. or other benefit under the INA. To the extent that it raises a legal 
issue, this argument lacks merit. Henry pled guilty and admitted to knowingly providing 
false information on a passport application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. A58-59. In 
so doing, she admitted that she sought to procure a passport by willfully misrepresenting 
herself as a U.S. citizen, which renders her removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  
Henry argues, as she did in her testimony before the IJ, that her misrepresentation 
was not “willful” because she believed she was a U.S. citizen when she applied for the 
passport. However, the IJ concluded that Henry was not an overall credible witness, that 
her testimony was a “self-serving . . . attempt to escape the consequences of her 
actions[,]” and that it was “belied by the clear and unequivocal statements” she had made 
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under oath before the District Court. A14-15, 17. We lack the authority to review this 
credibility determination, see Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that an IJ’s credibility determination is a finding of fact), and therefore disregard Henry’s 
self-serving testimony as well.  
Henry also argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) does not apply to false 
statements made to obtain a passport. This argument is also without merit, as a passport 
certainly qualifies as “other documentation” under the statute. See Cervantes-Gonzalez v. 
INS, 244 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Using fraudulent documents to obtain a 
passport is conduct that is clearly covered” under the statute). Henry is inadmissible 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  
c. Inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) 
Henry also argues that she is not inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) as an 
alien who falsely represented herself as a U.S. citizen for any purpose or benefit under 
federal or state law. This argument suffers from the same flaws as her § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 
argument. Before the District Court, Henry pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542. In 
so doing, she admitted that she knowingly misrepresented herself as a U.S. citizen for the 
purpose of obtaining a passport. This renders Henry inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). See Rodriguez v. Gonzalez, 451 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding 
that a guilty plea to an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1542 renders an alien inadmissible 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)). Again, Henry argues that she thought she was a 
U.S. citizen at the time she applied for a passport, but we decline to credit this testimony 
given the IJ’s credibility determination.  
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d. Waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) 
Finally, Henry argues that she is eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). This statute applies to aliens who are inadmissible under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (committing a crime of moral turpitude), and allows for waiver 
of inadmissibility if denying admission would result in extreme hardship to the alien’s 
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(h)(1)(B).  However, 
Henry is inadmissible based on three additional independent grounds. Thus, even if 
Henry’s inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) was waived, she would still be 
inadmissible and removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), (a)(6)(C)(i), and 
(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).  
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Henry’s petition for review. 
